Prince of Persia – Game Over

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Summary

Unit 42 published a blog at the beginning of May titled "Prince of Persia," in which we described the discovery of a decade-long campaign using a formerly unknown malware family, Infy, that targeted government and industry interests worldwide.

Subsequent to the publishing of this article, through cooperation with the parties responsible for the C2 domains, Unit 42 researchers successfully gained control of multiple C2 domains. This disabled the attacker's access to their victims in this campaign, provided further insight into the targets currently victimized in this operation, and enabled the notification of affected parties.

Post Publication

In the week following the publication of the original blog, we observed no unusual changes to the C2 infrastructure. Existing domains did move to new IP addresses, as we had previously seen periodically. Some new install domains were added, adhering to naming conventions of current domains (see appendix for new IOCs).

The attackers developed a new version (31), and we observed this deployed against a single Canadian target.

The file descriptions remained essentially the same ("CLMediaLibrary Dynamic Link Library V3"). Most importantly, there was **no change to the encoding key** (now using offset 20, and offset 11 for second pass against URL encoding) that we had observed being used for the entire decade-long campaign, and documented in our previous blog. From this we conclude that the attackers were unaware of our initial report.

Sinkhole

Through cooperation with the parties responsible for the C2 domains, we took control of all but one of them, transferring the A records to a server we controlled. This prevented the attackers from being able to subsequently make any further changes to the domain configurations, issue commands to victims, or capture any further data for the majority of victims. An analysis of connections after transfer suggests that the attackers may have used a third-party service to try to understand why they had suddenly lost almost all of their traffic. Figure 1 shows that tool, a geographic representation of victim-C2 traffic, with all but one at that time now communicating with our sinkhole server.




Figure 1 Graphical representation of victim traffic to C2

We have since transferred sinkhole control to Shadowserver, whom we thank for subsequent victim notification & remediation (https://www.shadowserver.org/wiki/pmwiki.php/Involve/GetReportsOnYourNetwork).

Victims

We were able to analyze victim C2 traffic to understand who were victims of the Infy campaign. We identified 456 malware agents installed on 326 victim systems, in 35 countries. Figure 2 shows a geographical breakdown of victim locations. We noted in our original blog the large amount of targeting of Iranian citizens in this campaign, we observed almost one-third of all victims to be Iranian. Also of note was the low overall volume of victims, compared to, for example, crimeware campaigns.



Figure 2 Geographic location of victims. Please note that New Zealand has been omitted from this map only because we observed no victim activity there.

Versions

In our original blog, we noted two distinct primary variants of the Infy malware. In addition to the original "Infy" variant, we also see the newer, more sophisticated, interactive, and fuller-featured "Infy M" variant deployed against

apparently-higher-value targets. Overall, 93% of all victims were infected with Infy, and 60% with Infy "M" (Figure 3). Combined with the low total number of victims, this suggests a great deal of care given to each individual campaign target. The large number of victims with both variants may relate to their complimentary feature set, or represent an "upgrade" path on victims from the original variant infection, later adding the "M" variant as targets appeared more compelling to the attackers.




Figure 3 Breakdown of Infy vs. Infy "M" infections

For the Infy "M" variant, we note that the majority of targets are using the latest version (7.8), and that none are using the older 6.x versions at all (Figure 4). This suggests that these higher-value targets are paid much more attention, being kept up-to-date with the latest version.

In contrast, for the more basic original Infy variant, we note a full spectrum of versions installed (Figure 5), with many victims on older versions – including the original, decade-old V1 – suggesting much less concern is paid to these individual targets (note that we did observe a small number of the older 6.x versions but these do not announce their version when connecting).




Figure 4 Infy "M" Victim versions




Figure 5 Infy"Original" Victim versions

Game Over

Shortly after the takedown, as well as a new Infy version (31), we also observed the registration of multiple domains 4/13

using a previously-seen pattern, against known campaign IP addresses. Almost every domain in the pattern-range box4035[.]net – box4090[.]net (138.201.0.134). These were not observed in any sample C2 lists however. Bestwebstat[.]com was sinkholed by another operator.

Some victims infected with Infy versions 15-24 still used the C2 server us1s2[.]strangled[.]net, which remained in the hands of the attacker. In early June the attackers used this C2 to issue instructions to download new Infy "M" version 8.0 from us1s2[.]strangled[.]net/bdc.tmp. This was the first time we had observed an Infy variant being directly updated to Infy "M". This used camouflage name "Macromedia v4", changed from "v3" seen in Infy v31. They also removed the voice recording capability in this version.

uvps1[.]cotbm[.]com was used for data exfiltration, previously at 138.201.47.150, after publishing of our original blog moving to 144.76.250.205. It was also hosting malware updates at /themes/u.php.

They also added a curious C2 entry "hxxp://box" (note: defanged for publishing). It's unclear how this should function; possibly a compromised victim intranet device, or the attackers have modified the HOSTS file on the victim computer.

After the take-down, the attackers began to add server IP addresses as well as domain names to their malware C2 list. They also slightly modified their ZIP password from "Z8(2000_2001ul" to "Z8(2000_2001ulEr3"). Their new malware version added antivirus checks for Kaspersky Labs, Avast, and Trend Micro. The malware data capture now searches for file extensions:

.doc, .docx, .xls, .xlsx, .xlr, .pps, .ppt, .pptx, .mdb, .accdb, .db, .dbf, .sql, .jpg, .jpeg, .psd, .tif, .mp4, .3gp, .txt, .rtf, .odt, .htm, .html, .pdf, .wps, .contact, .csv, .nbu, .vcf, .pst, .zip, .rar, .7z, .zipx, .pgp, .tc, .vhd, .p12, .crt.pem,.key.pfx, .asc, .cer, .p7b, .sst, .doc, .docx, .xls, .xlsx, .xlr, .pps, .ppt, .pptx.

and folder locations:

:\\$recycle.bin, :\documents and settings, :\msocache, :\program files, :\program files (x86), :\programdata, :\recovery, :\system volume information:\users, :\windows, :\boot, :\inetpub, :\i386.

The malware continued to use the **identical decryption key** seen over the entire history of this campaign.

Mid-June, through cooperation with the parties responsible for the C2 domains and law enforcement, we were able to get the remaining C2 domains null-routed and the directly-IP-addressed server disabled. This is the end of a decade-long campaign, though we naturally expect to see this actor back in some other guise before long.

Thanks to the Malware research team – Yaron Samuel, Artiom Radune, Mashav Sapir, Netanel Rimer – for assistance in the takedown.

Appendix 1 – Exfiltration Algorithm

The malware uses a different algorithm than that used for encrypting the malware strings to encrypt the exfiltration data, including:

- 1. Keylogger data + language.
- 2. Malware logs installation time, DLL path and name, log path, number of downloads, number of successful/failed connections.
- 3. Information about the victim computer: Time zone, list of drives and types, running processes, disk info.

First the malware adds 1 to all bytes, then an encryption key is initialized based on the victim computer name (the offset in the key is calculated by sum of the computer name letters %key length). Then the key is used to encrypt the data (see decrypt function). The encrypted data is then base64 encoded.

Exfiltration data decryption python code:

- 1 import os,sys
- 2 import string
- 3 import base64
- 4 import fileinput
- 5 FIRST_PHASE = "OQTJEqtsK0AUB9YXMwr8idozF7VWRPpnhNCHI6Dlkaubyxf5423jvcZ1LSGmge"
- 6 SECOND_PHASE = "PqOwl1eUrYtT2yR3p4E5o6WiQu7ASIDkFj8GhHaJ9sKdLfMgNzBx0ZcXvCmVnb"
- 7 global FULL_KEY
- 8 FULL_KEY= ""
- 9 def sub_1_for_hex(str_input):
- 10 str_output = ""
- 11 for letter in str_input:
- 12 try:
- 13 str_output += chr(ord(letter)-1)
- 14 except:
- 15 print "sub_1_for_hex func problem"
- 16 continue
- 17 return str_output
- 18
- 19 def sum_comp_name(comp_name):
- 20 sum = 0
- 21 for letter in comp_name:
- 22 sum+= ord(letter)
- 23 return sum
- 24
- 25 def init_key(comp):
- 26 comp_name_sum = sum_comp_name(comp)
- 27 carry = divmod(comp_name_sum, 62)
- 28 index = carry[1] -1
- 29 end_key = FIRST_PHASE[:index]
- 30 key = FIRST_PHASE[index:]

31	key = key + end_key
32	key = key + key
33	return key
34	
35	def decrypt(num_list,offset):
36	global FULL_KEY
37	input = ""
38	for num_str in num_list:
39	try:
40	input += num_str.decode('hex')
41	except:
42	input += ')'
43	result = ""
44	for i, c in enumerate(input):
45	i = i % 62 +1
46	try:
47	index = FULL_KEY.index(c)-1
48	except ValueError:
49	result += c
50	continue
51	translated = SECOND_PHASE[(index - i +offset) % len(SECOND_PHASE)]
52	result += translated
53	return result
54	
55	def found_infy_enc_data(line):
56	found_infy_str = "show=\" Administration Reporting Service "
57	found_infy_index = line.find(found_infy_str)
58	if not found_infy_index==-1:
59	return True,found_infy_index
60	else:
61	return False,found_infy_index
62	def extract_comp_name(line):

```
63
         comp = r"\xd\xa-----"
64
         comp index = line.find(comp)
65
         comp name = line[comp index+len(comp):]
66
         comp_name = comp_name[:comp_name.find("----")]
67
         print "(((=)))" + comp_name
68
         return comp name
69
70
      def extract enc data(line):
71
         header = r"\xd\xa "
72
         start_index = line.find(header)+len(header)
73
         line = line[start index:]
74
         endindex = line.index("____\" value=")
75
         line = line[:endindex]
76
         return line
77
78
      def write enc infy data to file(dec line,comp_name,filename):
79
         file1 = open(filename + "\\" + comp name + ".txt",'ab')
80
         file1.writelines(dec line)
81
         file1.close()
82
83
      def enc wrapper(enc,comp name):
84
         global FULL KEY
85
         print FULL KEY
86
         FULL KEY = init_key(comp_name)
87
         enc final = ""
88
89
         for letter in enc:
90
              if len(hex(ord(letter))[2:])==1:
              enc_final += "0" + hex(ord(letter))[2:]
91
92
           elif len(hex(ord(letter))[2:])==2:
93
              enc final += hex(ord(letter))[2:]
94
           else:
```

95	print "not good hex length"
96	exit()
97	
98	enc = enc_final.upper()
99	
100	enc = enc.replace("2E","21")
101	enc = enc.replace("C5DC5A","")
102	enc = enc.replace("D03D00","")
103	enc = enc.replace("0B0E","2121")
104	
105	enc = enc.replace("01","21")
106	
107	enc_len = len(enc)
108	
109	enc_rev = ""
110	num_list = []
111	enc_print =""
112	for i in range(0,enc_len/2):
113	enc_rev = enc[-2:]
114	if not enc_rev=="0B" and not enc_rev=="0E" and not enc_rev=="00" and not enc_rev=="D0":
115	enc_print +=enc_rev
116	num_list.append(enc_rev)
117	enc= enc[:-2]
118	
119	#the first part is always ok
120	dec_str = decrypt(num_list,0)
121	final = sub_1_for_hex(dec_str)
122	index = final.find("OK: Sent")
123	if index==-1:
124	print comp_name + " - did not found OK: Sent !!!!\n\n\n\n"
125	#exit()
126	decrypt_data = comp_name + " ++==++ " + str(i) + ": " + final + "\n"

127

128	final_start = final[0:500]
129	if final_start in UNIQUE_DATA:
130	print comp_name + " already have this data"
131	return
132	UNIQUE_DATA.append(final_start)
133	index = final.find("Installed Date:")
134	
135	if index==-1:
136	for i in range(1,61):
137	dec_str = decrypt3(num_list,i)
138	final = sub_1_for_hex(dec_str)
139	
140	##print all 62 options
141	index2 = final.find("PROGRAM START:")
142	index3 = final.find("Installed Date:")
143	if not index2 ==-1 or not index3 ==-1:
144	decrypt_data += str(i) + ": " + final + "\n"
145	write_enc_infy_data_to_file(decrypt_data,comp_name,FILE_OUTPUT_NAME)
146	
147	def read_enc_data_files():
148	
149	for root,dir,files in os.walk(PDML_PATH):
150	for file in files:
151	filename = root+ "\\" + file
152	if os.path.isfile(filename):
153	print filename
154	for line in fileinput.input([filename]):
155	line = line.strip()
156	is_found,found_infy_index= found_infy_enc_data(line)
157	if not is_found:
158	continue

159	line = line[found_infy_index:]
160	
161	#get computer name (for use in init_key() later)
162	comp_name = extract_comp_name(line)
163	UNIQUE_COMP.append(comp_name)
164	#get the infy encrypted data
165	line = extract_enc_data(line)
166	#base64 decode enc_data
167	dec_line = line.decode('base64')
168	#append enc_data to file
169	write_enc_infy_data_to_file(dec_line,comp_name,FILE_ENC_OUTPUT_NAME)
170	enc_wrapper(dec_line,comp_name)
171	try:
172	read_enc_data_files()
173	except:
174	print "exception!!!!"
175	

Appendix 2 –loCs

Infy version 31: f07e85143e057ee565c25db2a9f36491102d4e526ffb02c83e580712ec00eb27

Infy "M" version 8.0: 583349B7A2385A1E8DE682A43351798CA113CBBB80686193ECF9A61E6942786A

5.9.94.34 138.201.0.134 138.201.47.150 144.76.250.205 138.201.47.158 138.201.47.153 us1s2[.]strangled[.]net uvps1[.]cotbm[.]com gstat[.]strangled[.]net secup[.]soon[.]it p208[.]ige[.]es lu[.]ige[.]es updateserver1[.]com updateserver3[.]com updatebox4[.]com bestupdateserver[.]com bestupdateserver2[.]com bestbox3[.]com safehostline[.]com youripinfo[.]com bestupser[.]awardspace[.]info box4035[.]net box4036[.]net box4037[.]net box4038[.]net box4039[.]net box4040[.]net box4041[.]net box4042[.]net box4043[.]net box4044[.]net box4045[.]net box4046[.]net box4047[.]net box4048[.]net box4049[.]net box4050[.]net box4051[.]net box4052[.]net box4053[.]net box4054[.]net box4055[.]net box4056[.]net box4057[.]net box4058[.]net box4059[.]net box4060[.]net box4061[.]net box4062[.]net box4063[.]net box4064[.]net box4065[.]net box4066[.]net box4067[.]net box4068[.]net box4069[.]net box4070[.]net box4071[.]net box4072[.]net box4075[.]net box4078[.]net box4079[.]net box4080[.]net box4081[.]net box4082[.]net box4083[.]net box4084[.]net

box4085[.]net box4086[.]net box4087[.]net box4088[.]net box4089[.]net box4090[.]net